September 8, 2009

The Warlord in His Castle

"This country is like a cake. On the top it is cream. Underneath it is fire." – Hezbollah spokesman

"We don't want the great Syrian prison." – Kamal Jumblatt

The Middle East is a rough part of the world, especially for its ethnic and religious minorities. In the late 1980s, Saddam Hussein's Arab Nationalist Baath Party regime waged a war of extermination against ethnic Kurds in the north. Iran's Bahai community has been mercilessly persecuted by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his fellow Khomeinists for decades. The vast majority of Jews living in Arab countries were expelled to Israel, and many in the Arab world still hope to expunge them from the region entirely by destroying the country they fled to as refugees. Egypt's Coptic Christians are second class citizens, and many Christian women in Iraq feel compelled by Islamist extremists to wear Islamic headscarves on their heads even though the state doesn't require it. Libya's Moammar Qaddafi represses the indigenous ethnic Berber minority, and the Shias of Saudi Arabia live under the boot heel of fanatical Sunni Wahhabis.

I could go on, but you get the drift.

The Druze minority communities in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria have worked out a survival formula that works better than most. They're weathervanes. They calculate. They, more than other Arabs, side with the strong horse.

In Syria, the Druze support the Baathist regime of Bashar Assad. Israeli Druze are fiercely loyal to the state and fight harder than most against the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah in elite IDF units. Many Palestinians consider them traitors.

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Chouf Mountains, homeland of Lebanon's Druze

It's trickier for Lebanon's Druze. Politics there are vastly more complicated – as complicated as politics in Iraq, if not even more so. The country is, in many ways, a microcosm of Middle East politics generally. You can usually tell which faction in Lebanon has the upper hand both locally and regionally because the Druze tend to belong to that faction. But what happens when the region is stuck in stalemate and deadlock?

Lebanon's Druze leader Walid Jumblatt recently abandoned the anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah "March 14" coalition and declared himself politically neutral. Most seem to believe he did so because he thought Syrian power was on the rise again in Lebanon and didn't want to stay on the wrong side of the boss. A few say he fears a looming internal war between Sunnis and Shias and wants to step back and out of the way. He himself says compromise with Hezbollah, though it isn't desirable, is necessary because the Lebanese state is too weak to disarm a proxy militia backed by the powerful regimes in Syria and Iran. He believes, correctly, that Lebanon can't effectively take a hard line while the international community invites the rogue regimes in from the cold.

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Village town square, Chouf Mountains, Lebanon

More recently, though, he took a step back toward the "March 14" coalition while negotiations are stalled over the formation of Lebanon's next government. "That shows some confusion on Jumblatt’s part when it comes to regional dynamics," Michael Young wrote in NOW Lebanon, "and when Jumblatt is confused you can be sure things are confusing."

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Walid Jumblatt

Those who've followed his political trajectory since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri know that many have labeled him a Lebanese "neocon." He does, or at least did, fit the mold in some ways. He's not only the leader of Lebanon's Druze, but also the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, which is no longer progressive or socialist. During Lebanon's civil war, he accepted backing from the Soviet Union. His house in the mountains is still decorated with posters and knickknacks from Communist Russia. Much later, in 2005, he was one of the leaders of the Cedar Revolution that ousted the occupying Syrian military from Lebanon. He supported the Bush Administration's war to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and he even jokingly asked the White House some years ago to send car bombs to Damascus.

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Walid Jumblatt shows me pieces of his Soviet medal collection

Earlier this year, Christopher Hitchens, Jonathan Foreman, and I were attacked in Beirut by thugs from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The next day, Hitchens lauded Jumblatt at the American University as one of the "real revolutionaries" of the Middle East. The audience laughed. I'm not sure if he understands why, but I do, at least partly. Jumblatt is the type of quasi-feudal warlord that real communists used to put on trial and execute. His opposition to the Syrian regime was no doubt authentic – the Syrians murdered his father in 1977 – but he cooperated with that very same regime for more than a decade. He didn't fight his way into power by overthrowing a system; he inherited it from his father.

When Arab Nationalism and fervor for the Palestinian cause swept Lebanon before and during the civil war, he and his father championed both. When the Syrians ruled in Lebanon, he went along with that, too. When Lebanon later turned against Syria, he helped lead the charge. Now that Lebanon, and the region as a whole, is in a holding pattern and no one knows who will come out on top, Jumblatt doesn't know which way to jump.

None of this means every idea in his head is cynically calculated to best represent the "centrist" position. Nor does it mean the rest of the Druze don't sincerely feel what they say they feel. Jumblatt and his people are complicated. He isn't a revolutionary in the usual sense, but he isn't strictly a weathervane either as Lee Smith notes at the Hudson Institute.

He is a leftist, yet a "neoconservative." He's a quasi-feudal warlord who worked with the Soviet Union. He's an anti-Syrian revolutionary who collaborated with Syrian power. He's a sectarian leader who masterfully games the sectarian system to his advantage, but he hates that system because it restricts his power. (Because he isn't a Christian, Sunni, or Shia, he can never hold any of Lebanon's three most powerful posts which are reserved for them.) He champions the Palestinian cause and has no warm feelings for Zionism, yet he fiercely opposes all who fight Israel. The man is not easily pigeonholed or even explained, not by others, and not by me.

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Jumblatt residence exterior

I've met him more than once on various trips to Lebanon. The first time, years ago, he hosted me at his house in Beirut. More recently I visited Lebanon with a number of colleagues, and he hosted all of us at his Ottoman-era manor in the Chouf Mountains.

"How can we control our own destiny," he said, "when we have a state-within-the-state called the state of Hezbollah? When we have open borders to all kinds of traffic and weapons and people from Syria to Lebanon? Hezbollah has said it before and will say it now: 'Thank God the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon defend the interests of the Iranian Revolution.'"

Hezbollah has a tactical alliance with Syria, but a heartfelt one with the Islamic Republic regime in Iran. If you didn't know any better, you might think, while driving around Hezbollah's de-facto Iranian satellite state inside Lebanon, that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini or Iran's current supreme guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the dictatorial ruler of Lebanon.

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Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, South Lebanon

Hezbollah is doing its damndest to secure veto power in the next government cabinet even though it lost the election in June. If Hezbollah had won that election, two countries in the Middle East rather than one would be pursuing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's foreign policy.

"So we work day by day and compromise," Jumblatt said. "After the murder of [former Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri in 2005, and with some international support and pressure at that time from the Americans, from [French President Jacques] Chirac, from Europe, from the Arabs – Arabs meaning King Abdullah – we were able to force the Syrians out in late February 2005. But then it was, I think, the first time that [Syrian President] Bashar Assad was a little bit afraid. Then the killings and assassinations started again in June. The people who were killed from that time to the last one were people who denounced the Syrian presence and denounced the Syrian allies.

"We went at once, several times, to the [United] States with the one basic political issue, which was the International Tribunal that is supposed to bring the criminals to justice one day. Of course, we have said from the start it was the Syrian regime and their allies and proxies. But I was I think that at that time and up to now we have failed to bring enough pressure to the Syrian regime. As long as we have this Syrian regime next door, we won’t have a sovereign Lebanon."

He could have, and perhaps should have, added that he won't have a sovereign Lebanon as long as the current Iranian regime exists in Tehran. Lebanon regained some of its sovereignty after the Syrian military was driven out in 2005, but the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon has yet to defeat the Iranian Revolution in Lebanon.

"You did a good job in Iraq," he said, "so why don’t you do the same thing in Syria? I remember well the answer of Secretary of State at that time Condoleezza Rice. She said we should work on shaping Syrian behavior. It’s a very fragile and difficult situation here. Will the tribunal really change the behavior of the Syrian regime? I don’t know. Who knows? It’s the first time in history that such a tribunal is to be settled to fix up a political assassination. From the end of the Second World War you had the European tribunal, and the most prominent killers were in Serbia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. But these were genocides mainly. This one is for Lebanon."

It was a tense time as usual in Lebanon when he said this earlier in the year. The anniversaries of two political assassinations were being memorialized back to back – the assassination of Hariri in Beirut in 2005, and the assassination of Hezbollah commander Imad Mugniyeh in Damascus in 2008. Low grade political violence simmered in various flashpoint neighborhoods.

"Yesterday," Jumblatt said, "one of our guys was assaulted in Beirut. He died today and I have to go this afternoon to cool things down. We are living with action and reaction. We could respond by attacking a Shia, and it will again become a vicious circle. The Lebanese Army is doing its best, but it is unable to impose its authority, its dominance. It’s unable to fix up being a part of the state of war and peace, unable to look at carloads of weapons coming into Lebanon. Next to Hezbollah you also have the Palestinian bases inside the camps. There are, I think, facilities for all kind of hostilities hiding in bunkers and in tunnels."

Jumblatt is no friend of Israel and never has been, even though his co-religionists inside Israel are fiercely loyal to the state in Jerusalem. It's clear, however, that he has a serious problem with everyone who actually fights Israel and would opt out of the Arab-Israeli conflict entirely if he could.

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Inside Walid Jumblatt's house

"The other issue is the Shebaa Farms," he said, "which are not Lebanese. Officially, legally, they are not Lebanese. They were taken from the Syrians in the late 1960s, and by pretending that they are Lebanese we are still hooked into the Arab-Israel conflict. The Shebaa Farms are still under UN Resolution 242. And we have nothing to do with the 242 Resolution because in 1967 Lebanon did not go to war [against Israel]. The Syrian and Iranian policy is to hook Lebanon into the 242 Resolution and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan fixed up a settlement. Egypt, too. Of course, not Palestine yet. I don’t know when. Maybe it’s impossible."

Some of us in Jumblatt's house hadn't been to Lebanon before and wanted him to pull back a bit, to address some of the basics. Steve McCutcheon asked the first question.

"What tangible interest does Syria have in dominating Lebanon?" he said.

"If you look back to the so-called Baathist theory or ideology," Jumblatt said, "from the Atlantic to the Gulf, they have never accepted the fact that Lebanon would be independent. Never accepted that. So when the Baathists took power in 1963, it became the official excuse. Plus the fact that, putting aside ideology, for some years it was just a pretense for racketeering and using Lebanon for their interest. Not to mention the terrible American blunder in 1975 or 1976 when they gave Lebanon to Assad for one precise task, which was to destroy at that time the PLO and Arafat. And he did it. It took him some time, but he did it quite well. And there’s a common interest between the Syrian regime and the Israelis. They don’t care about independent Lebanon as long as they can trade Lebanon somewhere in the middle. They don’t care."

"At the end of your wonderful speech yesterday," Lee Smith said, "you said 'no compromise.' What did you mean by that?"

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A Lebanese woman listens to Walid Jumblatt deliver a speech in downtown Beirut

"When my father was killed by the Syrians," Jumblatt said, "I was obliged to fix up a cynical compromise because I needed allies and I needed routes for weapons and ammunition. At that time I had an important ally called the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union saved me. It trained my people. I had a small militia and they supported me through Syria. So, of course, I shook Assad's hand. I knew that he killed my father, but I tried to forget for some time. Some people in Syria stupidly thought that Bashar Assad could be a liberal, could be a modern democrat. Now all of them are in prison, and some are dead."

"When was the first time that you publicly accused Syria of killing your father?" Christopher Hitchens said.

"From 1977 until, let’s say, 2000, I had to keep silent," Jumblatt said. "In 2000 I challenged the Syrian president, and the Patriarch of Lebanon said it’s time for the Syrians to get out of Lebanon. That was a crucial year because that year the South of Lebanon was liberated from Israel, in April that year. [Former Syrian President Hafez] Assad died later on that year in June. I was accused by the Syrians of betrayal and treason. Later on we had to postpone our language. We still have some among us who take the romantic approach of Arab Nationalism. And later on came September 11 and the news that the Americans were about to invade Iraq."

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James Kirchick and Christopher Hitchens, Beiteddine, Chouf Mountains,. Lebanon

"You said the intervention in Iraq might have been helpful for the March 14 movement," Hitchens said. "Would that still be your view?"

Whether it's true or not, several Lebanese people have told me they think so because it convinced Assad that he might be destroyed if he didn't back down.

"It depends now on the outcome," Jumblatt said, "after America reduces its troops in Iraq. There are some signs in the last week that again the terrorists are blowing themselves up and trying to create chaos. It’s a very unstable situation. If there’s no compromise between the power surrounding Iraq – meaning the Iranians, the Turks, plus the Americans – I don’t know how Iraq can be stable. Also the Syrians, unfortunately, have been importing jihadists to the Damascus airport and exporting them to Iraq where they blow themselves up to go to heaven. Obama should be careful. He should be careful here and in Iraq. And he should be much more careful, of course, in the land that nobody was able to conquer, Afghanistan."

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Walid Jumblatt's desk (photo by Jonathan Foreman)

"Do you think the talks going on between Israel and Syria are genuine," James Linville said, "or are they just a show?"

"Assad doesn’t care about the [Israeli-occupied] Golan [Heights]," Jumblatt said. "Suppose we go ultimately to the so-called peace. Then later on, what is the purpose of the Syrian regime? What is he going to tell his people? Especially, mind you, he is a member of the Alawite minority. This minority could be accused of treason. It’s not like Egypt or Jordan whereby the government has some legitimacy. Here you get accused of treason by the masses, by the Sunnis. So using classic slogans like 'Palestine will liberate the Golan with Hezbollah' is a must for him to stay in power.

"I had a friend at the time – he is still my friend - when I was in Syria. He was the chief of staff of the Syrian army and is now living in Los Angeles. He was quite an important guy and honest with media. He was a Sunni from a big family in Aleppo. And when Hafez Assad was about to fix up the so-called settlement through Bill Clinton, and before they met him in Geneva, a prominent Alawite officer in the Syrian army came to Assad and said, 'What are you doing? We will be lost if you make peace. We will be accused of treason.'"

Jumblatt instinctively understands better than most how carefully Middle Eastern minorities must position themselves in order to survive.

"Do you think the long term interests of Syria and Iran are in harmony?" Linville said.

"I think the interests are too interconnected between the Syrian regime and Persia," Jumblatt said, "and I think Persia is now stronger. Assad the father was more clever. He used the Iranian Revolution, but he still kept his friendship with the Arabs, mainly with Saudi Arabia. Plus the fact that well before American invasion, the overthrowing of Saddam, we had an Arab state between us and the Persians called Iraq. Now the Persian Empire is in Lebanon."

"Will Lebanon change if Iran gets nuclear weapons?" I said.

"It will not change," Jumblatt said. "It will give them more prestige, of course, with their allies. At the same time, they are not going to use the bomb. It will provoke a series of armaments – an arms race – in Saudi Arabia, maybe Egypt. It will be crazy. We will have bombs everywhere."

"How important is increasing the power and discipline of the Lebanese army?" McCutcheon said.

"The Lebanese army is composed of Lebanese," Jumblatt said. "One third Sunni, one third Shia, and the rest Christians and Druze. You also have to look at the allegiances of officers and soldiers. Most of the Christian officers are Aounists. And when I say Aounists, I mean Hezbollah. Most of them. Hezbollah was quite clever and was able to infiltrate. The Sunnis are there, and if you go that far, and if you have tension inside Lebanon, it will exhaust the Lebanese army. It could break the Lebanese army. Breaking the Lebanese army, breaking the state, will make us wreak havoc and the peaceful revolution will go to hell."

He is almost certainly right that the Lebanese army would break apart along sectarian lines if another internal war breaks out. It happened during the civil war in the late 1970s. It happened repeatedly in Iraq until the Americans were able to recruit enough conscripts who wouldn't bolt and join the militias.

"Are you concerned about a replay of what happened last year up here on the mountain?" Lee Smith said, referring to Hezbollah's violent assault on West Beirut and Druze villages near the town of Aley last May.

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Lee Smith

"They can do anything on the mountain," Jumblatt said. "Just 20 miles from here you have the area of Jezzine, which is the second line of defense of Hezbollah. What is left of Jezzine is, of course, in a Christian area. Still, in ten years time or maybe more it will be a Shia area. 500 years ago it used to be Shia. On this side you have my old supply lines from the Bekaa Valley. They are cut, but they are there. And they have Beirut's southern suburbs. They can squeeze anything through, and it would be foolish on my behalf to go to a so-called civil war. This is why last time, when the clashes started, I did my best to stop the clashes. Anybody can fight when they are squeezed. Anybody can fight. But we don’t have supply lines. We don’t have weapons. We will end up emigrating from Mount Lebanon. To where? The sea? No. To Syria."

"Do you think if the election wasn't pending in Lebanon," Linville said, "that Hezbollah would have opened a northern front during the Gaza conflict?"

"They are not that stupid," Jumblatt said. "They have to understand the population of the south. They inflicted the Israeli army with big losses. And they were good fighters. But, of course, three years later, I don’t think doing the same thing would be very popular in the south of Lebanon. And when the so-called unknown rockets were fired, people of the south were scared. It’s not every day that you can rebuild your house. The fighters of Hezbollah can hide. They have caves, they have their own expertise. But they also have got to be accountable to the population."

"How can you praise Hezbollah for being good fighters," James Kirchick said, "and protecting the people of the south when they were the reason Israel responded?"

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James Kirchick

"Because my past," Jumblatt said, "my political heritage, from my father to myself, was to defend the Palestinian cause. That is my answer. And my father, although he was killed by the Syrians, was killed because he was defending the Palestinians in Lebanon."

"Do you support negotiations between Lebanon and Israel?" said Michael Young, the opinion page editor at Beirut's Daily Star and a contributing editor at Reason magazine.

"It's enough to have been accused of betrayal after the 2006 war," Jumblatt said. "And to negotiate what?"

"Withdrawal from Shebaa Farms," Young said.

Israel took the tiny Shebaa Farms area from Syria in 1967. Hezbollah claims Syria took it from Lebanon and that Israel therefore is still occupying Lebanese territory. The United Nations insists Shebaa Farms belongs to Syria and certified Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory in the year 2000.

"It’s not to be negotiated with the Israelis," Jumblatt said. "It is to be negotiated with the United Nations. And first it is to be negotiated with the Syrians. Up until now, Shebaa Farms is not legally recognized as Lebanese territory."

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Michael Young and Walid Jumblatt

"This is your position," Young said. "But it’s not the position of the state."

"Legally," Jumblatt said, "we need a signed document from the Syrian government, jointly signed by the Lebanese government, that says Shebaa Farms is Lebanese. So go to the United Nations. We could see if we could fix up an interim presence of United Nations forces in Shebaa. It could be possible, but I don't know. I don't think so."

"Is there any realistic way of either disarming Hezbollah or integrating them within the state and the army?" I said. "Or will this problem go on and on?"

"I think it will go on and on and on," Jumblatt said. "I think so. Unless – if you ask them, most of the Shia will give up their weapons in exchange for a political price. The political price will be maybe reshuffling of the actual Lebanese system. More power to the Shia community within the Lebanese sectarian system."

"That’s their ultimate goal, isn’t it?" I said.

"At the same time because, I mean, they are proud to have defended Lebanon against the Israelis," Jumblatt said. "After Gaza they said, 'Look, now you are asking us to surrender our weapons? Are you crazy?'"

"Israel wouldn't even come into Lebanon if Hezbollah wasn't kidnapping or shooting them," I said.

"They have invaded several times with excuse and without excuse from 1978 up until now," Jumblatt said. "They came clear to Beirut. Nothing has changed in Israel. Now it's Nasrallah, before it was Yasser Arafat."

"But if Hezbollah was disarmed," I said, "integrated into the state and the army, and the border was quiet, they wouldn’t come back here. I mean, why would they?"

"Why would they send their soldiers up here?" Kirchick said.

"There's a lot of reasons," Nicholas Noe said. He wasn't part of the group I was traveling with. He showed up at Jumblatt's gathering independently of the rest of us.

"What?" Kirchick said.

"Water is one reason," Noe said.

"Oh, come on," I said. "Be serious." Noe was putting forth an absurd conspiracy theory that had been bouncing around in Lebanon for as long as I've been traveling there, a theory that Lebanon's premier historian Kamal Salibi dismissed as "rubbish" when I asked him about it.

"Another reason," Noe said, "is possible rockets from some other crazy Sunni jihadist group that lobs them in to start a conflict. Another reason is possible transfer of population. Now you have [Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor] Lieberman in a lead role. These are all long-term threats. These might not be taken seriously by us as foreigners, but in Lebanon, as Mr. Jumblatt said, there is a long history of a lot of reasons for Israel to invade."

"Again?" I said incredulously. "With an armistice? Has Israel invaded Jordan since the peace treaty? Egypt? I mean, come on."

Hanin Ghaddar, an editor at NOW Lebanon who grew up in Hezbollah's southern stronghold, nodded in agreement with me. "Yeah," she said and laughed.

"The people of the south," Jumblatt said, "think the weapons of Hezbollah are protection against Israeli incursions."

That much is true. Supporting Hezbollah as a deterrent is perfectly logical if you sincerely believe Israelis want to annex Lebanon so they expand, steal water, or whatever. The problem with this, however, is that there is no constituency whatsoever in Israel for anything of the sort. It is a fantasy, and it's a fantasy that starts wars and kills people.

"Even though there were provocations at the same time?" Jonathan Foreman said. "Is there any way, in terms of states-within-states, is there any way…"

"I'm speaking about issues like that," Jumblatt said. "Realistically speaking. I’m not making moral judgments. This is Lebanon as it is."

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Jonathan Foreman

"You talk about the increasing strength of Hezbollah and the difficulty of your own supply lines," Foreman said. "Is there any way to strengthen the position of Hezbollah's opponents? Is there any way you and others can become stronger in relation to Hezbollah?"

"There is no way," Jumblatt said. "Again, it would be suicidal and an endless civil war without any results. I’m just concerned – I’m telling you, I’m concerned this very afternoon about the kidnapping and death of one of my Druze community members. We have to prepare for funerals tomorrow. And tomorrow there is this big Hezbollah celebration in the dahiyeh for [assassinated Hezbollah commander Imad] Mugniyeh. The Shias will come from the south to Beirut through some areas where we have Druze."

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Inside Walid Jumblatt's house

"Are you worried something could happen?" Hanin Ghaddar said.

"Yes," Jumblatt said. "I am worried. I have been told now by the army that they have caught some people, and I hope they found who killed this guy. The people of Hezbollah are much more organized. It's a regular army."

"If today you could arrive at a deal where Hezbollah agrees to disarm in exchange for more political power – would that be such a bad thing?" Michael Young said.

"This process," Jumblatt said, "this system, cannot survive. This system, this confessional system, has proven to be obsolete. For internal and external reasons, we dispute this system. One day, I don’t know how – it will be time to change. We cannot be still be stuck…"

"Wouldn’t a deal like this be a way of changing?" Young said.

"Two parliaments, two chambers," Jumblatt said. "A senate for the interest of the communities where they can be equal, and one non-confessional parliament."

"If you can push Hezbollah into this logic and say…" Young said.

"Yes," Jumblatt said. "Of course. It’s a proposition. But also you have to convince my partners, with the sectarian division and hatred now between the Sunnis and the Shia, and with the obsolete and backward mentality of some of the Maronites. They are still ruling Lebanon, but it’s no more the 19th century."

"Is that the socialist Jumblatt speaking?" Hitchens said.

Everyone laughed.

"The socialist Jumblatt died a long time ago," Jumblatt said.

Everyone laughed even harder. We all knew it was true despite his political party's brand name.

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Christopher Hitchens, Hanin Ghaddar, and Walid Jumblatt at lunch at Jumblatt's residence

"He died with my father," Jumblatt said. "He had a dream with the leftist parties to change Lebanon. It was my father's vision to change the system. This is also one of the reasons why he was killed. He was also seen by the Arab world as backing the communists. Somewhere in the Kissinger memoir he mentioned that my father was a radical communist. I told him his information was wrong."

"Not for the first time," Hitchens said.

Most of us in the room laughed again. We were familiar with Hitchens' slim volume denouncing Nixon's former secretary of state .

"Can you say a few words about what the Progressive Socialist Party means to you and what you might mean for them?" Hitchens said.

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Walid Jumblat's Library

"My father studied in Europe at one time," Jumblatt said. "As a member of a minority, he wished to achieve equality. He said it’s time to abolish the sectarian system in Lebanon. It’s time to have social justice, it’s time to redistribute land. He started with his own land because we were at that time one of the biggest feudal families of Lebanon. So he started with his properties. My mother told him, 'well, okay, but wait until you reach power.' My father said he had to be equal, like others. The sectarian system was against his wishes. And he paid."

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A stone marks the place where Kamal Jumblatt was murdered by Syrian regime agents during Lebanon's civil war

I have no idea how much of the Jumblatt family land was redistributed to poor Druze in Lebanon, if any, in fact, had been redistributed. He seemed to have plenty left. The Jumblatt family lives in real Ottoman splendor, and he gave us all a tour of his grounds. His home could be a tourist attraction if it wasn't his private residence.

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A courtyard at Walid Jumblatt's house

He had to cut our time short, however, so he could defuse a crisis.

As he said in the interview, a Druze man died that day after he was violently attacked by Hezbollah supporters a few days before. Enraged members of his community wanted revenge, and they set up road blocks on the highway over the mountains from Beirut to Damascus. Cars were stopped. ID cards were checked. Those identified as Lebanese Shias – and therefore possible Hezbollah supporters – were pulled from their cars and beaten on the side of the road with long wooden sticks.

It doesn't take much to spark sectarian violence in Lebanon. A few well-placed car bombs could ignite the whole country. Jumblatt was wise to put a stop to the sectarian beatings, and not only because such behavior is deplorable. Sectarian violence can easily spiral out of control. The civil war in 1975 was sparked by small clashes that mushroomed.

A tiny fraction of Lebanon's Druze follow Hezbollah supporter Talal Arslan instead of Jumblatt. Yet when Hezbollah attacked Beirut and the Druze areas in the Chouf mountains last year, Arslan's men fought alongside Jumblatt's and violently repelled Hezbollah's invasion.

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A Druze woman in her house desroyed by Hezbollah in 2008 (Photo copyright New York Times)

No matter how much Jumblatt may deplore Lebanon's sectarian system, communal ties are stronger than those that bind the nation or that bind political parties. If Hezbollah isn't careful, if Hezbollah comes off its leash again and kills people in Lebanon as it did last year, it will find that hardly anyone in the country who isn't Shia, no matter their calculations or politics, can side with a Iranian-sponsored militia in thrall to Khomeinism. Lebanese are no more likely than Iraqis to side with violent fanatics from other ethnic or sectarian communities when they are at war.

No matter how the Druze choose to navigate their way through Lebanese, Syrian, Israeli, and Middle East politics generally, they will fight with their tribe against any and all who would single them out for abuse. As local and regional minorities, they are unique in some ways. But they're more like the Israeli and Kurdish minorities than they are like the Bahais, the Copts, or the Alawites. They will not roll over, and they have more say in the direction of Middle East politics as a result.

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Posted by Michael J. Totten at September 8, 2009 12:58 AM
Comments

As I was finishing this great article a stray thought flashed across my mind.

Someone should design and market a board game called: "Warlords of Lebanon."

It would of course be a never ending game, set on a permanent table for generations of players to continue playing and plotting.

With no discernible nor wanted conclusion.

Papa Ray
West Texas

Posted by: Papa Ray Author Profile Page at September 8, 2009 6:11 AM

...Excellent suggestion, Papa Ray.

May I add some wholly transparent and layered tiers over your game-board, as in a three or more dimensional chess game?
Keep the game pieces translucent, but retaining their traditional shapes...Castles, Pawns, Knights...but their colors change slightly from time to time...keep a Bishop or two lurking about the edges; we can probably omit the Kings as they don't seem to last very long and don't have much manouvering room, and checkmates never seem to last either.
Alfred Nobel and the Curies can be the Judges sitting on those high stools.

Posted by: Morningside Author Profile Page at September 8, 2009 1:39 PM

"This country is like a cake. On the top it is cream. Underneath it is fire." – Hezbollah spokesman

What kind of cake is this guy eating?

Posted by: Schmedlap Author Profile Page at September 8, 2009 7:43 PM

What a fine piece with clarity and insights for folks with different levels of understanding of Lebanon. This piece was so engrossing, I couldn't read it fast enough, yet at the same time read it slowly to allow it to digest.

It was like a fine meal with an excellent selection of wine added.

Thanks for this. Learned a lot about the region and especially the complexities of Lebanon and how difficult it is to achieve stability there.

Interesting picture of Hitchens. He looks immensely uncomfortable. Perhaps the only question left unanswered in this piece.

Nicely done.

Posted by: Sheva Author Profile Page at September 9, 2009 6:20 AM

A particularly fine post Michael. I find your blog endlessly informative and insightful. (Your only rival for getting at how things are is Michael Yon and his beat is much more specific.)

Posted by: Lorenzo Author Profile Page at September 10, 2009 3:46 AM

Great work MT. I have lots of questions but for another day.

Posted by: maxtrue Author Profile Page at September 10, 2009 7:33 PM

Wow that is really great stuff!

Posted by: jachapin Author Profile Page at September 11, 2009 6:46 AM

....For those who don't have the time or inclination to read all of John Bolton's "Surrender Is Not An Option", a good excerpt will be his Chapter Fourteen, "Israel And Lebanon: Surrender As Matter Of High Principle At The UN."
Immediately under this title is the quote:
"John Bolton is right. This place is a mad house."
--French Permanent Representative Jean-Marc de La Sabliere, October 31, 2005.

The chapter is a delicious 41 pages.

Go for it.

Posted by: Morningside Author Profile Page at September 11, 2009 6:45 PM

Mike,

Note that Walid Jumblatt makes basically the same argument I've made on here several times with you, at least once in heated and lengthy exchange - there are no other solutions and no other futures for Lebanon than redrawing the political map so that the Shia get, at least temporarily, the control equivalent to their political, military, and demographic primacy.

You'll never get rid of, disarm, neuter, or solve, or fundamentally change Hizballah until some time after the Shia get their turn in command of the state.

The range of control we do have is in how it all happens. If we stir up enough shit, we can help make change be a process of flame and sword.

I suppose another variant is the return of direct Syrian control, which is really only a variant as the Shia's relative power would adjust in a similar manner.

But the March 14, the minority quasi-democracy, or even a minority sunni-christian quasi-democratic coalition, won't be able to stay both in charge and even psuedo-democractic for long. They face the same demographic dillemma as Israel would have if they'd annexed the West Bank in 1968, but without the military dominance.

Posted by: glasnost Author Profile Page at September 17, 2009 4:34 PM

I'm kind of surprised that Jamie Kirchick even allowed himself to be pictured for such a nuanced discussion.

Posted by: glasnost Author Profile Page at September 17, 2009 4:35 PM

I kind of like Walid Jumblatt. Fisk has a man crush on him. The Saudis like him. So do America . . . and dare I say it Israel. Anyone with his political talents is a freaking genius.

Posted by: anand Author Profile Page at September 17, 2009 5:36 PM

Could a successful Iraq moderate Hezbollah or empower Amal? Are Lebanese Shia really more radical than Iraqi, Iranian, Afghan, Pakistani, Turkish and Indian Shia? In all the later countries Shia are the most open to friendship and cooperation with the international community and nonmuslims.

Posted by: anand Author Profile Page at September 17, 2009 5:40 PM

"Could a successful Iraq moderate Hezbollah"

What's your idea of a "moderate" Hezbollah? One that doesn't brag about the Jewish body parts it has?

Posted by: Gary Rosen Author Profile Page at September 19, 2009 1:11 AM

In all the later countries Shia are the most open to friendship and cooperation with the international community and nonmuslims.

This is something like a general principle of demography. Not always, but typically, noncompetitive minorities > 25%, as a made-up rule of thumb without any siginificant external support are the 'liberals' in a national political landscape.

Posted by: glasnost Author Profile Page at September 19, 2009 8:41 AM

Anand: Could a successful Iraq moderate Hezbollah or empower Amal?

Iraq will not moderate Hezbollah, and Amal is already empowered.

Anand: Are Lebanese Shia really more radical than Iraqi, Iranian, Afghan, Pakistani, Turkish and Indian Shia?

Yes.

Posted by: Michael J. Totten Author Profile Page at September 19, 2009 8:47 AM

What is the relative strength of Amal versus Hezbollah (popularity in the Shia and non Shia Lebanese street)? Is Amal scared by Hezbollah's militia, or would Hezbollah delegitimize itself by violently attacking Amal (by angering Lebanese Shia)?

What foreign support does Amal have (Iran, Iraq, global Shia community, West, Saudi Arabia and Arab League, covertly from Israel, Turkey)?

One possible scenario that could empower Amal and/or Hezbollah moderates:

1) Mehdi Karroubi, Mohsen Rezaee, Mousavi, Khatami, Rafsanjani (who is close to the Saudis let us remember), and 10 of the 12 Marjas (Grand Ayatollahs)in Quom who are opposed to Khameini succeed in weakening or displacing Khamenei/Ahmenijad. They empower Nasrallah's opponents within Hezbollah or Amal in retribution for Nasrallah's overt loyalty and support for Ahmenijad and Khamenei.

2) The global Shia Marjas publicly praise Amal and the moderate parts of Hezbollah and de facto tilt against Nasrallah (many will do so subtly since they don't like involving themselves in worldly politics.) It is not hard to imagine Indian, Afghani, Pakistani, Qom, Najaf Marjas doing this, especially once they succeed in managing Khamenei (which appears to be their short term priority.) A list of the major Marjas is here:
http
://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_marjas

3) The Iraqis decide to significantly fund Amal and/or the moderate parts of Hezbollah. Once Iraq is able to boost natural gas and oil exports, and after oil and natural gas prices surge again; I think this will probably happen. Criticism of Nasrallah by the global Shia clergy would probably make this type of funding politically beneficial to any future Iraqi government. Moreover, the Iraqi Shia will want to get back at Nasrallah for backing the rogue JAM and special groups that were defeated by the GoI/Najaf Marjeya/Dawa/ISCI/moderate Iraqi Shia (with US help) in the Iraqi civil war.

I would imagine that most Lebanese Shia will want to associate themselves with those they see "winning" within the global Shia community (Iraqi Shia and the opponents of Khamenei inside Iran); as well as the large majority of global Shia Marjas. If other Shia groups in Lebanon provide more social services than Nasrallah because they get greater international funding, Lebanese Shia might be further drawn to other leaders.

I would argue that the scenario laid out above has a significant probability of playing out. At the very least, Nasrallah would be forced to greatly "moderate" his public image.

Posted by: anand Author Profile Page at September 20, 2009 12:35 PM

anand, who are the "moderates" in Hezbollah? Who among them condemned Nasrallah's barbarism?

Posted by: Gary Rosen Author Profile Page at September 20, 2009 5:22 PM

Michael,you forgot to mention that Junblat's men were manning the Bater crossing along side the Israelis.I personally crossed the Bater on my way to the south to visit my family.I was unable to distinguish between the Israeli army and the Druze "fighters".You showed us his various alliances except his alliance with Israel.Reason?

Posted by: Mohammad Fawaz Author Profile Page at May 25, 2010 10:02 AM

"They[Druze] will not roll over, and they have more say in the direction of Middle East politics as a result."In fact,they are ,virtually, non existent in the Arab/Islamic world except in Lebanon and Syria.They have no voice in Syria what so ever except to repeat what Bashar preaches.Now,in Lebanon,they were rendered a non entity after the May events with the Shiaa.As for their effect in Israel,they are totally Israelis and also repeat whatever the Israeli preach.
Junblat is working hard to preserve his feudal rule making sure it continues with his son taking over.Sayyed Hassan guaranteed him that.

Posted by: Mohammad Fawaz Author Profile Page at May 28, 2010 6:10 AM
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Winner, The 2007 Weblog Awards, Best Middle East or Africa Blog

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