September 29, 2006

Talking, Not Writing

I have been making my living as a writer of one kind or another for years, as a technical writer, travel writer, opinionated bloviator, journalist, and reader-supported blogger. It's the only real skill I have, so thank God I've made it work. Otherwise I'd be waiting tables or tending bar. Sometimes, though, I need to talk instead of write. That’s what I’ve been doing for the past couple of days.

I spent a few days in New York and a few days in Washington. Doubleday editor Adam Bellow was kind enough to give me the spare room in his Manhattan apartment. He and I spent two days on and off working out a verbal agreement for our next project. The first project he and I put together – which isn’t a book, exactly – should be announced in a couple of days. Our second project will be a great deal larger and more significant if everything works out and, well, you can probably guess what it is.

Lebanese blogger Tony Badran called me as I was getting ready to leave New York for Washington. So I turned the car around and spent the afternoon with him and Paul Berman (author of Terror and Liberalism) in the Cobble Hill neighborhood of Brooklyn. Paul took us to a Jordanian Bedouin restaurant and guided us through the menu. Tony may be an “Arab,” (the quote marks are on purpose, long story, ask Tony) but Jordanian Bedouin food is not exactly the sort of thing you’re likely to find in the hip and sometimes snobbish establishments of Beirut.

Paul suggested Tony, Lee Smith, and I join forces on the Internet. We should write, edit, and archive articles in one place instead of in several. See Lee? See Tony? I told you guys we ought consider something like this. Berman came up with this all on his own, apropos of nothing. It isn’t just me.

Then it was time to head down to Washington for the Pajamas Media panel at the National Press Club. I went for the socializing, the networking, and the shop talk more than for the panel. Lots of us did. The panel, for me anyway, was what made the important parts possible.

Those of us who sent an RSVP picked up name tags at the door. I’ve always thought name tags were a bit dorky, but they had an interesting effect at the pre-panel cocktail party. I’d walk around the room making eye contact with various people. I recognized some by their faces. Others I didn’t. Few people recognized me. They looked at me the same way everyone else in the world I don’t know looks at me. Then they saw my name tag and something clicked. They knew who I was by my name, but not my face.

It happened over and over again, and it happened to lots of us. It was pleasant but odd. Nothing like that ever happens in regular life. It can’t. The only time I walk into a room and everyone recognizes me is when I walk into a room full of my friends. But then they know me by face. Even the most famous writers in the world won’t have that kind of experience except when specific people are artificially herded together in one place. Journalists and bloggers make up a geographically fragmented community. Sometimes it's nice to be in one room.

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Since few people recognized me, here’s what I look like. At least this is what I looked like on the night of the PJ event. I don't wear a tie every day.

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Just before the event I visited the Washington Memorial with Fausta (left, and yes that’s her real name) and Judith Weiss.

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Here is Roger L. Simon, with his new hairless Kojak look, at the podium introducing the panel discussion of how partisan is too partisan?

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Democratic pollster Mark Blumenthal sits next to Jane Hall of Fox News on the panel.

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Richard Miniter wore a pair of silk pajamas. But he wasn’t the most casually dressed at the event. His jammies cost 3,000 dollars.

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Reason magazine editor Nick Gillespie wore a “D.A.R.E to keep kids off drugs” t-shirt, which is a bit like me wearing a Hezbollah t-shirt. (As a side note, though, I did pick up a Hezbollah t-shirt in Baalbeck. My brother bought a Hezbollah flag. Because it was funny! That doesn’t mean I would wear it, especially not in Beirut or Jerusalem. Nick would get the joke, but a Lebanese army officer saw us buying that stuff and sadly shook his head in disappointment.)

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Brookings scholar, friend, and all-around good egg Andrew Apostolou (left) showed up for the shmoozing and had to leave early. Andrew visited me in Beirut and, because he is not American, was allowed to visit the Lebanese border when Hezbollah was planning its latest assault. The (Lebanese, not Hezbollah) military intelligence officer in Saida wouldn’t let me leave Lebanon’s sovereign territory because he said it was too dangerous.

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Adam Bellow (left) chats it up with Oxblog’s David Adesnik.

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PJ editor Gerard Van der Leun, who sort-of recently relocated from Los Angeles to my part of the country.

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Glenn Reynolds moderated the event. Michael Barone of US News and World Report is to his right.

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Some of us went out for food and drinks after. Here is Glenn again with Austin Bay.

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Here are Sandra Rozanski (left) and Claudia Rosset. Claudia and I were also in Beirut at the same time, but we didn't meet until we both went to Washington.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 11:10 AM

September 24, 2006

On the Road

This weekend I’m staying at Doubleday editor Adam Bellow’s house in New York City, and tomorrow I’m driving to Washington DC to attend a Pajamas Media conference at the National Press Club. After the DC conference I’ll be driving from the East Coast to the West Coast, camera in hand, and will blog the road trip home. In the meantime, we’ll be a little slow around here.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 5:46 PM

September 21, 2006

Nasrallah's Malaise

Hezbollah Victory Cartoon.jpg

While I'm being slow, here is something to read. Hezbollah really did get its collective ass handed to it.

UPDATE: See also Mustapha at Beirut Spring and Abu Kais at From Beirut to the Beltway.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 12:54 AM

September 20, 2006

Slow Blogging

Slow blogging again. Sorry, I know I keep saying that. I'm planning a trip to the East Coast. It will be partly social and partly work-related. I'm also buying a car over there and saving many thousands of dollars by doing it. So I'll be driving back. Should be fun. More material from Israel will be posted before I leave.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 1:48 AM

September 16, 2006

Getting Lebanon Wrong

Right after the end of the Hezbollah war I interviewed two members of Israel's Peace Now who stayed on a kibbutz just a few kilometers south of the border under Katyusha fire attack. Not wanting to give space only to the Israeli left, I sought out someone who could give me a different point of view, someone who was not an officer or spokesman for the Israeli Defense Forces, someone who could speak his or her own mind freely without having to answer to the government or the army.

Yaacov Lozowick seemed perfect. He's the archivist at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem, and he wrote a book called Right to Exist: A Moral Defense of Israel's Wars. His Introduction is titled Why I Voted for Sharon.

Right to Exist Cover.JPG

If anyone would be able to provide a clear and thoughtful defense of Israel's most recent war in Lebanon, it should be him. But he did not say what I thought he would say. The Hezbollah War, or whatever it ought to be called, is one of the least popular wars in Israel's history.

We met at Yad Vashem and he gave me the best insider's tour of the museum I could ever have hoped for. Afterward we sat down in the restaurant to talk about his book and the recently concluded hostilities.

MJT: So your book is a defense of Israel’s wars. All of them?

Lozowick: (Long pause.) No.

MJT: The main ones?

Lozowick: No.

MJT: Well, what’s missing? If it’s not a defense of all of Israel’s wars, which ones are not…

Lozowick: The ones that aren’t defensible.

MJT: And which ones are not defensible?

Lozowick: Lebanon One [in 1982] was not defensible. Although the first three days of it could have been. Lebanon Two wasn’t in my book, and that was a stupid one.

MJT: Why was it stupid?

Lozowick: It was stupid because we stumbled into what…it wasn’t a full-fledged war, but it was pretty close to it. From the perspective of the people living up north it was a full-fledged war. So we stumbled into what was an almost full-fledged war with absolutely no prior strategy. If you look – and you don’t have to go back far, we had an election here in March – you can go back and look at the election campaign, it was all of six months ago, and you will not find Lebanon mentioned once. It was totally off the map. It was not a subject that interested anybody. It was off our screen. We had left Lebanon in 2000. Those of us who are educated enough to follow the newspaper and to remember what is says knew that Hezbollah was building this tremendous armory of weapons that were aimed at us. We put it in the way back of our minds, didn’t deal with it, and we went to war with them with a prior notice of about 32 seconds. So that’s one very strange thing.

The second one was that over the next two days Olmert defined for us what the goals were. And they were goals that we could definitely agree with, but they were not realistic.

And the third thing was that after taking us to war in 32 seconds and having defined goals which were very…far reaching goals, he then did nothing to make them happen. He just squandered. He wasted time. There has never been a war – except maybe 1948 – that Israel started out with as much diplomatic…if not backing at least it was acquiescence…as this one, right? The Americans were backing us. Tony Blair was backing us. The Germans, the Czechs, and the Poles were sort of backing us. And most of the West was saying okay, well, you know, let’s pretend we don’t like it, but if you kill the Hezbollah that’s fine. We’ve never been in that situation. Those are better opening cards than we’ve ever had.

MJT: Yeah.

Lozowick: So what did we spend the first days doing? Killing Lebanese civilians for no obvious reason that anybody could see. Right? Bombing Lebanese bridges I could see. You didn’t like it at the time, but that I could see. There’s a military…

MJT: I can see it too. I don’t like it, but I get it.

Lozowick: There’s a military justification for that. You can rebuild bridges.

MJT: Right. It’s not like bombing a restaurant.

Lozowick: Right, but we were clearly not…I always say if you’re ever in the mood for some real good hardcore criticism of Israel…

MJT: Only if it’s intelligent…

Lozowick: …the best and almost only good place to go, you go to Ha’aretz. They are better at it than anybody else because they know what they’re talking about. There was a guy in Ha’aretz, I don’t remember who it was, about the second week of the war, demonstrated in a factual tone of voice that the moral criteria which we were fighting this war were lower than the war with the Palestinians.

It’s very simple. The IDF finds a terrorist holed up in a building in Nablus. They will surround the building. They will…at the end of the day they will have killed the guy or arrested him. But they will not do so as long as civilians are in that building. One civilian and one terrorist and we will figure out a way of getting rid of the civilian before we kill the terrorist.

In Lebanon we weren’t doing it that way. By the third day it was obvious that we had changed our own rules. We were still being careful. We weren’t using Hezbollah tactics. But we were not abiding by the rules that we use fifty miles south.

MJT: Okay, so let me play Devil’s Advocate. It’s a lot easier for them to have these rules inside Nablus – isn’t it? – because they can kind of control Nablus, at least on again off again control, and they know the area. But the dahiyeh [Hezbollah suburb] south of Beirut is 100 miles from the border. And the IDF has no ground control over that place, ever. Not even Lebanon has control of that place. Only Hezbollah does. So how could the IDF have those rules of engagement all the way up there?

Lozowick: I don’t know the numbers, and I don’t know if anybody does know the numbers, but I don’t even know the number of the dead civilians up in the dahiyeh. It wasn’t very high.

MJT: I saw the pictures, and it doesn’t look good.

Lozowick: It doesn’t. But as far as we know – and we could be wrong here – the populace of the dahiyeh had at least a twelve-hour warning that this was going to happen and at least most of them weren’t there. There must have been tens of thousands of people living in the dahiyeh. You were there.

MJT: Yeah, it’s not the size of Tel Aviv, but the size of Ramallah maybe.

Lozowick: Okay. So tens of thousands of people live there. We killed…500 of them? That means that most of them weren’t there. Right? Now, clearly it’s easier to do this in Nablus than in the dahiyeh, and I think from the perspective of the Israelis that a certain amount of collateral damage was inevitable. But…what for? Killing Lebanese civilians in order not to achieve anything…there’s no justification for that that any of us can see.

So we stumbled into this thing without thinking, we set very high goals, we had international backing at one point to an unprecedented degree, and then within days we were killing hundreds of civilians which…we don’t like. The army was saying “it will take us ten days and we’ll kill off Hezbollah.” So had we killed off Hezbollah and had 600 dead Lebanese civilians, nobody would have been happy about it, but maybe you say, okay, maybe there’s no choice. Hezbollah hides itself among civilians, etc, etc, etc. I don’t know. The question would have been raised after the war, not during the war, and it would have been raised in any case, but maybe we would have said there was no choice.

But by the second week of the war the air force clearly wasn’t going to beat the Hezbollah. And then we squandered a week doing absolutely nothing. And then in the third week of the war, and the world is getting more and more impatient with us, the goodwill that had been there was being dissipated. We finally started going in there with totally the wrong forces. They were sending in small units. You know, it wasn’t even done right.

MJT: If I quote you saying all this stuff, I can already see what’s going to be said about what you’re saying. I’ve already said a lot of this myself and was dismissed by the right.

Lozowick: What I’m saying, this is…

MJT: You’re saying a lot of what the Peace Now guys said. Some readers of my blog told me I need to get out of the left-wing bubble. And here you are saying…

Lozowick: Okay, I’ll delineate for you. Number one. I’m saying that although the war was not planned and certainly was not discussed, way over 90 percent of the Israelis in those first days thought it was justified. Myself included. And it was justified even if we were killing some Lebanese civilians because there’s no way you can get at Hezbollah without also getting people that Hezbollah is using as shields.

MJT: Yeah.

Lozowick: Also, so that’s one. Basically I’m smack in the middle. I’m about as close to the Israeli consensus as anybody can be. With springs left and right. Because I zigzag myself. I’m more critical than mainstream Israelis at the moment because of the Lebanese civilians. People can say “Michael, you’re quoting a lefty on that one.”

I’m also saying something which is more right-wing. And that is, I’m not saying that the war shouldn’t have been carried forward. It should have been carried forward. We should have poured in five divisions. We should have done it with as much force as we could muster. And we should have killed every single Hezbollah fighter in Southern Lebanon. I’m not saying it’s a stupid war because it couldn’t have been won. Because I think it probably could have. Or anyway it could have been fought on a level where it would have been obvious to everybody that although Nasrallah on the last day of the war could have been claiming victory it would have been clear to everybody that he’s just talking through his hat.

Having said that, I think that you can quote me as much as you want because this is what most Israelis are saying.

MJT: It’s just funny because I was told by several people to get out of the left-wing bubble. And I’m talking to you, and you’re out of the left-wing bubble, and it sounds the same. There’s a right-wing bubble here, too, isn’t there?

Lozowick: Yeah, the settlers.

MJT: I hate to stick labels on you, I’m just trying to figure out what the Israeli political spectrum is.

Lozowick: We’re in one of those very rare cases right now where there is a consensus. There was a consensus at the beginning of the war that stretched deep into the left-wing bubble. I’m not talking about center-left. Deep into the left. And the consensus now is that it was a stupid war. And that’s, again, left to right. It’s a stupid war because it caused tremendous damage without bringing anything.

MJT: But is there a consensus for why it was a stupid war? Or do you have a left-wing critique, a centrist critique, and a right-wing critique? Because it seems to me like there are some people who are upset that it was stopped early, that it should have been more ruthless. And I’ve heard others say it was too much, it was over the top.

Lozowick: You have to remember where Olmert is coming from. Olmert is a lawyer at heart. He’s also a politician. There’s this trauma of Lebanon from 1982. And we dare not march large forces into Lebanon because our own populace won’t allow it. And the air force says we can do it from the air, so let’s do it that way. So that’s where they were at the first few days.

What I think happened – and I thought so at the time also – was that by the end of the first week…the Israelis are a very educated public when it comes to waging war. Unfortunately. Okay? We know what we’re talking about. We know what we’re talking about on a personal level and on a national level. It was pretty clear to all of us by the end of the first week that this was not going to work because there were going to have to be ground forces.

I think that a sizeable proportion of the Israelis would have been willing or even eager to have a real invasion of Southern Lebanon in the second week. Olmert, I think, didn’t realize that and didn’t follow that. He drew it out until the fourth week. Now, by the fourth week we get people like David Grossman who published a quarter-page ad in the newspaper who said this is a just war. We didn’t expect that from him. And then a week later was saying it’s time to stop the war. His reading of it was that if you haven’t beat the Hezbollah by now then you’re not going to. And maybe we even can’t. And if we’re not going to and we can’t then it’s time to stop the war. That’s the left.

From the perspective of the more military-minded right, it was the other way around. It was, if it’s not going to happen in the third week, then at least it should happen in the fourth week. Which is why at the end they were saying “don’t stop.”

But both camps, the argument between them is the argument that appeared in the third week. In the first two weeks they were all of the same opinion. And that is: we’re in it, we have to go kill the Hezbollah.

When Israelis are angry at one another, they’re angry. And they’re not angry at one another right now. They’re angry at their government and they’re angry at the generals. You get this movement of soldiers and parents who are from two different directions and have somewhat different agendas, but they’re merging. The two groups are the parents and the soldiers. It’s not left and right. There are left and right in both of those groups. They haven’t worked together for twenty years and they will not work together again for the next twenty years. But right now they’re working together. And everybody is conscious of all those three sentences. They know that they haven’t in the past, they know that they won’t pretty soon, but right now they know who they are. Because everybody is aggravated and furious at the political leadership for totally mismanaging the war and at the military leadership.

MJT: So you thought the 1982 Lebanon war wasn't a good one either. What is it about Lebanon? Israel doesn't seem to get Lebanon.

Lozowick: It's a complicated place.

MJT: It is a complicated place. It's the most complicated place I've ever been.

Lozowick: Well…

MJT: I spent seven months there and it took me three months before I felt like I had a grip on the basics. It took three months to get Lebanon 101.

Lozowick: (Laughs.)

MJT: And that was before I could start fine tuning and drilling down into anything. Just getting a mental map of the place and who's who and what they really think, what they say. It's…not an easy country.

Lozowick: You have to remember that up until the 1970s, Lebanon was not regarded by the Israelis as an enemy at all. We were fighting war against the Egyptians and the Syrians and sometimes the Jordanians. The Lebanese were not participating in any of this. Even in 1948 the Lebanese hardly participated.

MJT: And it's still sort of that way.

Lozowick: Well…

MJT: After Hezbollah it is totally that way.

Lozowick: Perhaps, yeah. I can remember in the late 1960s there was no fence between Israel and Lebanon. There was a line sort of there which…part of the problem in 2000 was that nobody remembered exactly where it was.

MJT: Right. They had to redo it with the U.N.

Lozowick: And they did it with old maps. Unlike some places where you can go and see the old patrol roads, like in 1967. In the case of Lebanon there was no old patrol road. Israel even today, Israel has never been at war with Lebanon. It was at war with the PLO. And now it's at war with Hezbollah.

MJT: What do you think about how the Lebanese government insists, seriously or not - and I say, to an extent, not - that they're at war with you? The Lebanese government does say this. But they never act on it.

Lozowick: Well, I think legally they probably are. There's a state of war between Israel and most of its neighbors. Egypt and Jordan no longer. There's a state of war between us and Iraq also.

MJT: That's finished, though. It's de facto finished.

Lozowick: Lebanon…why do we keep getting Lebanon wrong? Maybe it's precisely because we're not at war with Lebanon. Next time we go to war with Syria, which may happen, we will be at war with Syria. We will hit Syria. When we go to war in Lebanon then it's not quite clear who we're at war with.

MJT: It's a war in Lebanon rather than a war with Lebanon.

Lozowick: In a war with a country you win by hitting that country so hard that they call uncle, basically. There are even more drastic ways of winning wars, but basically that's the standard way. You win a war until a country says they've had enough and can't do this anymore. If it's not a country then…how do you do it?

MJT: It's like that in the West Bank. The West Bank is not a country with a government that controls everything either.

Lozowick: And we've never managed to fully win a war with the Palestinians. We functionally win wars with the Palestinians, we functionally won the second intifada.

MJT: It stopped.

Lozowick: Yeah. So functionally life is normal here. That's part of the problem between us and the Palestinians. One of the things that the left in Israel used to say was that we need to give the Palestinians a state among other reasons so that we have somebody to hit if they continue to wage a war against us.

MJT: It might work and it might not. Who are you going to hit in Lebanon? They have a government. And they also have a terrorist army separate from that.

Lozowick: I think the third Lebanese war, by the way, will look different. Because we'll get our act together.

MJT: You really think there's going to be another one?

Lozowick: Don't you?

MJT: Probably. I think there's a small chance there won't be.

Lozowick: It's not inevitable, it's like…

MJT: Predicting the Middle East, politics and war, is kind of a fool's game. There are so many variables and surprises that…the way I see Lebanon right now is that literally anything could happen.

Lozowick: There's no doubt that we are preparing for the next war against Hezbollah. We're not ready for it now. And given the depth and breadth of the stupidities and mistakes that we just did, then it will take a while. But we won't make the same mistakes twice. Lebanon and Hezbollah will now remain on our radar. They're not going to drop off like they did before. And remaining on our radar means that serious money and serious effort will be put into preparing for the next round.

MJT: Do you really think it's possible to solve the Hezbollah problem without dealing with Iran and Syria? They're trying to rearm Hezbollah right now. And they'll do it for a third round, too, unless they have some reason not to.

Lozowick: Had we severely hit Hezbollah now…I mean, you can't eradicate them. The idea is in the minds of half a million people. You can't make that go away. But had we in this war really severely reduced the strength of Hezbollah, and then the French would have come marching in without hesitation because they wouldn't have had to confront Hezbollah, would the Lebanese government plausibly been able to then take over? Maybe they could have.

MJT: If you could knock Hezbollah down by 90 percent, then yes.

Lozowick: Yeah. That's what we thought we were doing.

MJT: But do you think that's really possible? I mean, look at how long Israel and Hezbollah were slugging it out until 2000. Like the US in the Sunni Triangle in Iraq. It's been going on for a long time. I think the insurgency in Iraq is breakable, but it's going to take a long time. With Hezbollah it's the same thing.

Lozowick: No. Hezbollah is better armed than the insurgency. And they're more visible. You can hit them with bigger stuff. They're more concentrated in a very clear area. If there were armed Hezbollah guys up in Nabatiya, we didn't have to hit them. They weren't bothering Lebanon either in some major way. Most of Hezbollah's armed power was either in the Bekka Valley or in Southern Lebanon facing us. Had we - I don't want to say demolished - had we seriously hit them in Southern Lebanon and then moved aside for a heavy European force whose job is to hold the hand of the Lebanese central government until they can grow into it…that's basically what Ehud Olmert said in his first speech during the first week. He didn't spell it out that way, but he basically said that's what the goals of the war were. And we could have done that. We would have just had to run a different war than the one we ran.

And you know what? We could have done so, probably, while killing a lot fewer Lebanese civilians in Beirut. We didn't gain anything from that. Hitting their command post site made sense, but you know what? It turns out that hitting their command post didn't make much difference. They weren't in disarray. Either they had subterranean communications that we didn't figure out. Or they prepared themselves so well they didn't need the command post. The guys underneath that bunker in the village in Southern Lebanon knew exactly what they were supposed to do. And they had it all worked out for six weeks. And the only thing we needed to do then was get into the bunker and kill them. And hitting the command post in Beirut didn't make any difference.

You can forgive the army for not knowing that in advance. You cannot forgive our army for not knowing that they were dug into these gigantic labyrinths. That, we should have known about. How come we didn't know? It's ridiculous. You can't build those things shovel by shovel with nobody noticing it. Not if they're good enough to withstand aerial bombardments. Not knowing that Hezbollah could keep going without its head…maybe we can be forgiven for that. I don't know. But we're doing it wrong. All right?

The peacenik that is in me - and I used to be one - prefers every method except war. But the experienced soldier in me, and also the historian in me, tells me that military power really can achieve most of its goals if done correctly. It doesn't always, but it can.

Military power cannot make your neighbors love you. You cannot force them to make peace with you. There's no way you can do that. Only they can do it. But you can hit your enemies to a degree that they no longer threaten you. So if you quote that no one will tell you that you're in the left-wing bubble.

There is a group of hard-core left that does have a knee-jerk reaction against us just about all the time. What was interesting about the first week of this war was that support of the war even lapped that group. It got that far left.

There's another thing you need to remember, too, and that's historical context. Israeli society, as you'll see when you read the last few pages that I added to my book when it came out in paperback, a significant majority of Israeli society wants to end the occupation.

MJT: What percentage do you think? Do you know?

Lozowick: Anywhere between two thirds and 80 percent, depending on which day you ask them. The reason Arik Sharon did what he did in Gaza is because he's a canny politician and he wanted to be re-elected. And he was playing to that group, which crosses political parties. Okay? He was playing to that group. The reason he pushed through the disengagement from Gaza was because he felt confident at every single moment of the process that he was backed by a solid majority of Israelis.

Previous to that, Ehud Barak was elected in 2000 on two planks. One was that he was not Bibi Netanyahu, a catastrophic prime minister. And the second was that he was going to get us out of Lebanon. That was his promise. He got elected on that plank, and indeed he left Lebanon. And up until this summer, many people in Israel would tell you nothing Barak did was right except for that.

Olmert was coasting to victory, partly on Sharon's coattails, but mostly not. We're not idiots. We know that if Sharon's gone, Olmert can’t replace him. He's Olmert, not Sharon. He was coasting to victory because he was going to do the same thing in the West Bank that Sharon had done in Gaza.

The fact that his victory was no narrow, then, was because he's a fool. He made some stupid statements. He was arrogant. He said “we're gonna win.” In American politics every presidential candidate always says “we're gonna win.” That's the way it happens. With us, no. You don't say that. You say “we will try to win.” But to say “the election's finished, we already won,” as Olmert did a month before the election, it's very stupid. He turned off a sizable chunk of his voters.

The point is, by the summer of 2006, Palestinians were busy proving to us that the disengagement from Gaza was a mistake. And they were busy forcing down our throats that a disengagement from the West Bank would be an even bigger mistake. And then having the Hezbollah join the fight and say leaving Lebanon was also a mistake, that was just too much for people to take. Part of the reason that so much of the left was so solidly behind this war was because they had to win the war in order to be able to continue on the program of getting rid of the occupation.

That's why Olmert was able to go to war in 32 seconds. Because everybody was absolutely furious at the situation. And it has to be changed. The fact that they made it even worse makes everybody even more furious. But that wasn't foreseen on the 12th of July.

MJT: So do you think it was a mistake to leave Lebanon and Gaza?

Lozowick: No.

MJT: Why?

Lozowick: Because Zionism is not about controlling Arabs.

Post-script: Please hit the Pay Pal button and help pay travel expenses for independent writing. I am not a rich person, and I can’t do this without help. I want to do more of this in the future, and I intend to go back to Lebanon soon. Other countries tentatively on my list include Iran, Algeria, Bosnia, Dubai, and Afghanistan.

If you would like to donate money for travel expenses and you don't want to use Pay Pal, you can send a check or money order to:

Michael Totten
P.O. Box 312
Portland, OR 97207-0312

Many thanks in advance.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 12:23 PM

September 13, 2006

“A Volcano of Terror”

Tank at Karni.jpg

SOUTHERN ISRAEL, NEAR GAZA - On June 25, 2006, eight armed Palestinian men emerged from an underground tunnel through a hard-to-see hole in the ground, fired an RPG at an Israeli tank, killed two soldiers, snatched another young soldier, Gilad Shalit, and stole him away into Gaza. The attack lasted seven minutes. The Israeli Defense Forces then launched Operation Summer Rain against the kidnappers, against those who fire Qassam rockets at Israeli civilians, and against those who dig tunnels under the earth so they can smuggle weapons out of Egypt and carry out terrorist attacks inside Israel.

Soldiers keep watch on the border at a small military outpost just south of Kibbutz Nir Am.

Gaza Lookout with Major.jpg

There I met Major Tal Lev-Ram, Spokesman for the IDF Southern Command. He unfurled an enormous map of Gaza and asked me please not to take any pictures of it. Code names for villages and neighborhoods were hand-written with red ink in Hebrew.

IDF Spokesman Southern Command.jpg

“When we left the Gaza Strip we didn’t think the terrorism would stop,” he said. “We understood that there would no longer be any legitimacy for them to act. A year after they continue to re-arm. The terrorist groups — Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad — they did not turn the areas we left into schools, factories, and so on. They became training camps for the terrorist groups.”

The major knows passable English, but he chose to speak to me in Hebrew through a translator. I had hoped for an interview with an English-speaking officer. But none of the spokesman for the Southern Command are fluent in English. All the English speakers were sent to the Northern Command so they could talk to foreign media during the Lebanon war. Only Israeli journalists who write and broadcast in Hebrew showed much interest in the military confrontation in Gaza.

“We also left the Egypt-Gaza border,” he said. “The Egyptians are responsible for it now. They are doing an okay job, but there is still a lot of smuggling and so on.”

“They’re using tunnels?” I said.

“We found two tunnels just two weeks ago,” he said. “They are very organized, with electricity and everything. One city straddles the border. It’s basically one city on each side. They are digging tunnels to connect them.”

“Do the Egyptians shut down the tunnels?” I said.

“We spend great effort finding and exposing the tunnels,” he said. “The Egyptians make an effort, but it is not the highest priority for them.”

I taped our conversation with a digital voice recorder, as is routine for me lately. A young Israeli soldier took notes by hand at the same time. Perhaps it was her job to make sure I did not misquote the spokesman. Or maybe she was checking on him. It's hard to say. I didn't ask her why she recorded everything, and no one in the military ever told me I need to clear my work with any censors.

“We have good defenses on the border fence,” the major said. “Last year more than 70 terrorists were killed trying to breach it. Because the area is very confined, terrorism is brewing. They keep trying to find ways to go outside. It is like a volcano of terror. It needs to go somewhere. They try to go around, out into Egypt, and then over to the Israeli side. Sometimes they try to cross back in right next to Gaza. Other times they go down near Eilat [at the bottom of Israel.]”

Gaza is tiny. It's 30 or so miles long and only a few miles wide.

Israel Map.JPG

“[They try] to go around the border,” he said, “in order to move information, training, and terrorists, and ammunition to their side from the West Bank. They are always trying to find ways to go around the Israeli border. They also fired something like 1,000 Qassam rockets since the disengagement until now. For no reason.”

“How many people have been killed by the Qassams?” I said.

“This year?” he said. “Zero.”

Zero! No wonder the Israelis who live near Gaza haven't evacuated. Southern Israel at war is not like Northern Israel during Hezbollah's Katyusha war.

“But terror is terror,” he said. “If you are afraid to send your child to a kindergarten, for me it’s the same. For now it’s the Qassam. In the future they will have more than today. 20 people in the past were killed by the Qassams. And like I said, terror is terror. You feel terror.”

I asked him if he thought the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was a good idea. He wouldn't answer and said that his opinion as a military man didn't matter. The Israeli military takes orders from the democratically elected government, and that's that.

“One of the major events after the disengagement,” he did say, “was the election of Hamas. They became the government in the Gaza Strip. Their principal goal is to destroy Israel. And they actually commit terror. Israel can’t accept that we left the Gaza Strip and still face daily terror attacks on and over the fence. Around 60 times charges of 50 kilograms were exploded on the fence. Also RPG and M-16 attacks on the fence against our forces. On Passover an attempt was prevented to go into a Kibbutz near the Karni Terminal…The second event that had a significant role in changing the rules of the game was the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit. We came to the decision that we need to take some sort of aggressive action in the Gaza Strip. The decision was to act against specific cells in different places. So we’re not talking about conquering land. We’re talking about operations of a few days each. We’re going in to destroy the infrastructure of terrorists. We can’t finish all the terror. But we can punch against it. During these operations more than 200 terrorists were killed. Weapons storages, training camps, all the infrastructure, factories where they make Qassam rockets.”

“How do you know where the factories are?” I said. “Do you have Palestinians informers?”

“We have good intelligence,” he said and laughed. “We have good military intelligence.”

It's no secret that many Palestinians cooperate (or “collaborate”) with Israel against terrorists. But I decided to be a good sport and let him deflect the question. He wouldn't be able to say anything on the record that isn't already widely known anyway.

“Another pattern that’s unusual,” he said. “They use the civilian population as human shields.” It's not really unusual. Hezbollah did the same thing in Lebanon. Fighters in Iraq do it there, too, although some in Iraq also deliberately murder Iraqis.

“Does the local population let them do this?” I said.

“It’s a problem,” he said. “Sometimes we see resistance. But it’s difficult to judge from our perspective. We see a lot of cases where Katyusha or Qassam rockets are fired from within populated areas. More than that, they came up with a system that was based on the fear that we would find the exact location of the rocket launchers. So they place the launchers with a timer. And ten, eleven, and twelve year old children come and take the launcher away afterwards. Often we’re faced with fourteen or fifteen year old youth who come, armed, and place charges along the fence. When we see them, even when we see that they are armed, if they are only fourteen or fifteen we only shoot to scare them. We don’t actually fire at them. Of course, only if there is no immediate danger to our forces.

“Our general instructions,” he continued, “not just in the these cases, is if we see a militant who is armed, a terrorist, and there is no immediate danger to our forces, we don’t fire if there is a danger that we would hurt the innocents, people who are not involved. But with that, it’s important to say that when we have such aggressive fighting in populated areas, when there’s an exchange of fire between terrorists and the IDF, there are cases where innocent people get hurt. But we warn as much as we can to step back, step away, to clear the area. So we see the terror organizations as responsible when civilians get hurt. And when there is a case and we know that a civilian was killed by mistake or unnecessarily, we check ourselves. When a rocket is fired and we respond with artillery fire, there could be civilians hurt. We don’t fire into populated areas. Only to the exact spots where they fired Qassams. If it’s in the middle of the city, we will not shoot.”

Sadly it's impossible to fight terrorists, guerillas, or whatever you want to call them, in populated areas without hurting civilians. No one has yet invented the Bad Guy Bullet that flies safely past innocents and hits only the armed. The fact that Palestinian terrorists, like those everywhere else in the Middle East, make blending in with the civilian population part of their modus operandi means civilian casualties are unavoidable in a fight. It doesn't help that Gaza is one of the most densely populated places on earth.

“About a month and a half ago,” he said, “another event that shows you the dilemma here: Two terrorists with an RPG tried to shoot a tank. We shot back. In the same house the mother of them, and a cousin, were in the same house. They fired five meters away from where the mother and cousin were standing. The Palestinian headline said that a mother and child were killed. The child was twenty two years old. And he was a member of Hamas. So, I am not happy about the mother. But, this is my right. You know? In the houses of Hamas militants, and all the other terrorist organizations, there are storages of weaponry. That’s because in the past we would avoid attacking houses with families. Which raises the question: Sometimes we as the IDF care more about the families and the children than he who would put them in danger. In a house, let’s say of three floors, a whole floor may be used as a storage.”

A tunnel had recently been found near the Karni terminal where goods and materials cross from Israel into Gaza. I asked if I could see it.

“I will take you to Karni,” he said. “But you cannot see the tunnel. It is inside the Palestinian territory. One kilometer inside. You understand? It is one kilometer inside the Palestinian territory.” In other words, the tunnel diggers are determined. They will spend Lord only knows how many hours digging and digging and digging, knowing most tunnels are discovered before they're completed, just on the off chance that they'll make it all the way into Israel and get to maybe kill one or two people.

“One more thing I want to say,” he said. “We will not stop the military action until Gilad Shalit comes back to us. But — and I say this to the press all the time — if there will be silence on our side for our villages it will be quiet on the Palestinian side.”

“How many soldiers have been killed since Gilad Shalit was kidnapped?” I said.

“All the year, before Gilad Shalit, no one. In the Shalit event, two soldiers died. And after that one more soldier died from friendly shooting. That’s all. So this is the big question for them. The spokesman of the government for Palestinians three days ago said the same thing I say all the time. For what? For what? For three soldiers who were killed in Gaza. In all the year something like 500 terrorists died in Gaza. So for what? The organizations of terror need to understand that it’s not worth it for them. And they can choose. We left the territory in the Gaza Strip, so it’s up to them. We will not stop the Qassam only with military pressure. They need to decide that they want to stop it. And if they will stop the Qassams, if they will stop the terror, free Gilad Shalit, we won’t have anything to fight about. And Karni will be open more. And everything will be better for them, not for us. This is the question. This is the biggest question, I think. And if you have time to read what the spokesman for Hamas government said, I think he can replace me.” He laughed. “Yeah? This is the truth. He is a good man.”

And he laughed again. Not because he was joking, but because it truly is an alternate Middle Eastern universe when the spokesman for Hamas echoes precisely the views of the spokesman for the IDF Southern Command.

Skeptical? Read for yourself. Hamas Spokesman Ghazi Hamad comes across like a world-weary man ground down and plainly despondent from a largely self-imposed Palestinian catastrophe.

I had a faint hope after Hamas was elected that the reality check from hell might finally kick in. And at least in one case, and for one day, it did.


The major drove to an area near the Karni Terminal in his jeep.

Karni Terminal Sign.jpg

I followed behind him in my rental car. He took us straight into a dirt field. I nearly took the muffler off my poor little Hundai when I drove over a basketball-sized dirt clod as hard as a rock. We stepped out into the open where there was no shade from the fierce Levantine sun at the end of the summer. Distant machine gun fire was almost, but not quite, drowned out in the wind.

“Kalashnikov,” said my translator who, like many Israelis, can identify weapons by sound.

A large truck-mounted surveillance camera monitored Gaza just to our left.

Gaza Surveillance Truck.jpg

“Two days ago was Gilad Shalit's birthday,” said the major. “One soldier from his unit said he was glad to be in Gaza fighting the people who took him. His family and friends released hundreds of balloons into the air from the place where he was kidnapped.”

I wanted to know about that tunnel the IDF found.

“The plan was to use it for suicide bombings at Karni,” he said. “I can’t understand it. Karni is their lifeline, their life. This is the biggest reason we closed it. It’s hard to understand why they keep doing these things at the crossing points unless they are trying to make life harder in Gaza.”

Two months ago Palestinian police stopped a car bomber heading toward Karni. Six months ago the IDF stopped three terrorists with M-16s, grenades, and suicide bomb belts at the Erez crossing point where people, rather than goods, transit into and out of Gaza.

“We think there are many many more tunnels,” the major said. “The Kelem Shalom action [where Gilad Shalit was kidnapped] was through a 700 meter-long tunnel. We can’t just stay here and wait for the tunnels to come to us. In a few hours we will bomb that one we just found.”

And bomb it they did, from below. Click here to watch the video.

“How many Qassam rockets are they firing now?” I said. I saw more than a dozen Katyushas fired from Hezbollah in the north, but I did not see a single Qassam fired from Gaza.

“Sixty per week at the start of Operation Summer Rain,” he said. “Ever since the number has been going down. Now there are only five per week. Hamas has partly put a stop to this because they know terror does not work for them.”

“How good are the fighters in Gaza compared with the Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon?” I said.

“I don’t mean to dismiss anyone,” he said. “Some fights are serious here. But you can’t compare them with Hezbollah. Hezbollah has more weapons and uses more guerilla activity. Hamas doesn’t have big rockets yet. Yet. The word yet is very important. Hezbollah also is more organized. You shouldn’t underestimate anyone. We had some people wounded in the fight here. Some in Gaza fight very good. But we killed hundreds of terrorists since Summer Rain. We had only one soldier killed in friendly fire, and ten to twelve wounded.”

“How long until this fight is over?” I said. I meant the current fighting in Gaza, but he seemed to have thought I meant the Arab-Israeli conflict in general.

“I don’t see the end now,” he said. “Maybe this part will be soon be finished. Shalit will be back. For a while it will be quiet. The question, you know, is for the other side. Because we went out of Gaza and then it started. If they get more democratic and reduce the chaos…that’s my hope. We need to be strong and give a chance for something else. It’s in the interest of the Palestinian side now to have another life.”

We left the field and drove straight to the fence. I wanted to get as close to Gaza as possible. We parked next to large concrete wall placed there for protection.

“So this wall,” I said. “Is it to protect us from snipers or from rockets?

“From everything,” the major said. Barriers of all kinds are erected near the Palestinian territories. One road I took next to the West Bank was shielded on one side by bullet-proof glass because some Palestinians like to randomly shoot rifles at cars.

The fenced border between Israel and Gaza was right in front of us. The fence is electric. It won't shock you if you touch it. But it will send a signal to the Israeli military telling them where contact was made so they can dispatch soldiers to that location.

“What would you do,” I said, “if you saw somebody from the other side walk up and stand right there?”

Gaza Through Barbed Wire 3.jpg

“Eh, it depends,” he said.

“It depends on what he’s doing?” I said.

“Of course.”

“If he’s just standing there it’s not a problem?” I said.

“No, it’s a problem,” he said. “Because sometimes they come like a citizen and they put charges there. If it’s in the day and we see a man, the soldiers come. If someone goes to the fence he has some reason. If we see some people come in the night we have a procedure. We start by shouting to them to go. But if they continue…okay? If it’s in the night, well you know, night is night. The thing is to make them understand not to come. Sometimes Palestinians come and want to go into Israel to work. They want to come into Israel not for military action but to come inside for working. But it is very complicated, especially in the night, to know who is the person.”

“How many people who come to the fence aren't here to fight?” I said.

“Here is a sad story,” he said. “One Palestinian went to the fence with a grenade. Not a militant. He came to the fence and we did not understand it. Because we told him to stop and he dropped it and everything was okay. Sometimes they want to be in the Israeli jail.”

“To get out of Gaza?” I said.

“Because maybe the food in the jail is better,” he said. “I don’t know. It’s a few, it’s not, you know, all the time.”

Gaza itself is often described as a prison. The reason I didn't go in there myself is because I was briefly affiliated with Time magazine and they ordered me to stay out. They had neither the time nor the inclination to take out a war insurance policy on me. But a Danish journalist I know, Louis Stigsgaard Nissen, did get a brief tour of Gaza and she described it as an absolute horror, a far worse place than the West Bank which both of us had visited in the past.

Trash has not been collected for months, so much of Gaza City looks like a garbage dump that happens to have buildings inside it. The garbage is seeping now into the water. Israeli doctors are returning because the Palestinians desperately need medical help. She interviewed a man who lives in a sports stadium with his children. She was nearly run over in the street by a truck driven by gunmen and bristling with weapons.

Gaza Through Barbe Wire 2.jpg

“Is anyone really in charge inside Gaza?” I asked the major.

“That is the question,” he said. “They have a government, but there is a power struggle among the armed groups.”

Once again we heard rapid machine gun fire in the middle distance. He and I stood right next to the concrete wall and could have taken cover. But the shooting had nothing to do with us and sounded just barely far enough away. So we didn’t move. It's funny what you get used to. I've never been in the army, and I'm unaccustomed to being in war zones. But it doesn't take long to get used to it.

“We have a connection with the Palestinian police and with the army,” he said. “For example if we found some charges that they put on their side of the second fence the Palestinian police come to take it or to boom it. In the operations today because of the army, and the pressure, and the militants, there was a fire between us and the Palestinians next to a place where gasoline was stored and also some baby chickens, you know, the little ones. And we talked with the Palestinian police and they brought some trucks in to take them out. We saved them from the RPGs.”

He spoke in English now instead of through a translator, and I wasn't sure I understood.

“So the Israeli side and the Palestinian side cooperated in the middle of a war to save baby chickens?” I said. “And then started fighting again?”

“Not exactly,” he said. “If you see the story as a simple one, yes. But the ones we talked with were not the ones shooting the RPGs. So it’s a very complicated story. But we talked with the police and the citizens talk with the army to help them. We told the citizens: Not now. It’s dangerous. The militants are firing RPGs.

Gaza Through Barbed Wire.jpg

“It is very strange,” he continued. “But it is our world. It is us against them, but they are divided inside. This is the story of Gaza.”

Post-script: Please hit the Pay Pal button and help pay travel expenses for independent writing. I am not a rich person, and I can’t do this without help. I want to do more of this in the future, and I intend to go back to Lebanon soon. Other countries tentatively on my list include Iran, Algeria, Bosnia, Dubai, and Afghanistan.

If you would like to donate money for travel expenses and you don't want to use Pay Pal, you can send a check or money order to:

Michael Totten
P.O. Box 312
Portland, OR 97207-0312

Many thanks in advance.

All photos copyright Michael J. Totten

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 2:50 AM

September 10, 2006

What I Did on my Five Day Summer Vacation

It cost me nothing extra in airfare to stop in New York for a couple of days on my way home from the Middle East. So I stopped. I always get New York envy, wishing I lived there instead of out in the provinces, so to speak. The Pacific Northwest, though, is without a doubt the one relatively “provincial” place where I most prefer to live if New York or Los Angeles aren't in the cards. Quality of life is very high here and doesn't cost all that much. At least it doesn't cost me all that much since I was lucky/smart enough to buy a house before prices reached halfway to the moon.

Portland from Freemont Bridge.jpg
Portland, Oregon

Here is a picture of Portland (home) that I took two days ago, a few hours before Marc Danziger (aka Armed Liberal at Winds of Change) showed up with his wife TG two-thirds of the way through their motorcycle road trip from Southern California up to Canada.

I spent ten hours or so on Labor Day in New York hanging out with various bloggers, journalists, and editors from the area. Tony Badran (aka Anton Effendi) from Across the Bay met me for beers in Greenwich Village with a small cigar jutting out the side of his mouth. Tony told me he got Lee Smith hooked on those things when they were hanging out in Beirut back in the day. But Lee has since downgraded to Marlboro Lights or some other weenie brand of tobacco. Lee insisted I “pinch Tony's fat Levantine ass and tell him I miss him.” I declined the pinching portion of the request. And anyway Tony is not at all fat, just for the record.

I didn't take a picture of Tony (didn't even ask, actually) because every Lebanese blogger I've ever met is cagey about revealing their true identity for various reasons. Not everyone is worried about the Syrian car bombers — many have far more mundane reasons for preferring to keep their identities private, much like many American bloggers I know. But Tony is a little more, er, outspoken about the criminal behavior of the Assad regime, and he's a bit more publicly known than the rest as it is. He works for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, after all, and I decided not to “out” him any more than he's already been outed. Michael Young at the Daily Star blew his blog cover (Anton Effendi) long ago, and pretty much everyone who knows his blog already knows his real name.

After spending a few hours discussing the Byzantine minutiae of Lebanese and Syrian politics we headed over a few blocks to the Good Restaurant where a NY blogger shindig was scheduled.

Not everyone who showed up has a blog, which is the norm for these things.

Ken Silber.jpg

Here is science writer Ken Silber. Last month he and I both appeared in the same issue of Reason magazine. I wrote about the Kurds in Iraq and he reviewed the Flock of Dodos documentary about the ongoing argument between evolutionary biologists and the “Intelligent Design” crowd.

Mary and Fausta.jpg

Mary Madigan (from Exit Zero and Dean's World) and Fausta.

I had not met Fausta before, but I met Mary last time I was in New York, and she guest-blogged for me during my first trip to Lebanon.

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Doubleday editor Adam Bellow chats it up with Morgan from Overheard in New York.

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Adam's father, if you didn't already know, was Nobel Prize-winning author Saul Bellow. It was good to finally meet him. He and I are working on a project together which will be formally announced here shortly. (No, it's not a book. Not yet anyway. Although if “book” was your first guess, it was a good guess!)

Morgan at Good Restaurant.jpg

Morgan wins the prize for Most Modest Person of the Evening. He acted genuinely surprised when he found out pretty much everyone at the table reads his blog.. Dude, your blog is like six times more well-read than mine. It's one of the most well-read in the world.

Judith Weiss and Eric Deamer.jpg

Judith Weiss, lead writer at Kesher Talk, and Eric Deamer, formerly The Young Curmudgeon.

Judith organized the whole deal, picked the restaurant, and gave everyone directions. Just a few days before I met her in NY (for the second time) I had drinks on the beach in Tel Aviv with Benjamin Kerstein, one of Judith's co-bloggers and founder of his own Diary of an Anti-Chomskyite. The blogosphere is big, but it also is small.

Several blog readers showed up as well. I can't remember everyone's name. (Sorry!) But those who read blogs rather than also produce their own are just as interesting and engaging dinner companions as anyone else. It was a pleasure to meet you all.

Left side of table Good Restaurant.jpg

Mary in Discussion.jpg

Judith, Mary, and I stayed out later than everyone else, just like the last time I visited the city and met up with a bunch of people. We left Good Restaurant and lingered at an outdoor table at another place down the street until they shut it down and forced us to leave. Then we walked to the edge of Manhattan overlooking the river toward Jersey City.

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Jersey City from Manhattan

I was too tired to do much of anything work-related after I made it back home to Portland. So I just cooled my heels in the city with Marc Danziger and his wife (no picture, sorry) before heading off to Mount Rainier with Sean LaFreniere (left) and Patrick Lasswell (right).

Sean and Pat Mt Ranier.jpg

I've known Sean since I was a kid. And I worked with both Patrick and Sean for years in the high tech industry before the collapse, before all three of us switched careers years ago.

I went to Northern Iraq with both of these characters — with Sean on my crazed road trip from Turkey, and with Patrick on my consulting gig earlier this summer.

There is nothing quite like walking part way up the side of a mountain when you need a bit of decompression.

Mt Ranier From Distance.jpg

Mt Ranier and Forest.jpg

Top of Ranier from Trail 1.jpg

Hiking Trail Mt Ranier.jpg

Mt Ranier Ridge in Clouds.jpg

Mt Ranier Top in Clouds.jpg

I never thought I would actually be hit by a suicide bomber or a Katyusha while I was in Israel. But there's something to be said for knowing the odds of such a fate, at least at a given moment, are zero. (A mega-gigantic volcanic eruption, on the other hand, was imperceptivity greater than zero.)

Now that I'm rested and recharged, I'm ready to write up the remaining material I brought home with me from Jerusalem and the Gaza environs.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 7:24 PM

September 9, 2006


I've been lazy and not blogging, I know. But I've been tired from the Middle East, from the war, and I had wonderful visitors from Los Angeles in the spare bedroom. It's about time to come back to the world now, so hang on a sec…

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 1:02 AM

September 6, 2006

Home Again

I'm back in my West Coast abode and need to recover from jet lag and general travel exhaustion. Shelly and I also have house guests coming over later today — Marc Danziger (aka “Armed Liberal” at Winds of Change) and his lovely wife. Back soon with pics from New York and articles from the Middle East.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 11:11 AM

September 4, 2006

The View from My Window

I’ll be in New York for another 24 hours or so and will get back to writing as soon as I’m home. In the meantime, here are some pictures from my hotel room window in Tel Aviv.

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Toward the sea by day.

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Toward the city at night.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 11:52 AM

September 1, 2006

On My Way to New York

Soon I will be in New York City for a few days, and there’s a social blogger meetup thingie scheduled for Monday night. I’m going to be incommunicado shortly, so if you are interested in attending and aren’t some freakshow stalker type person, email Judith Weiss and get the details if you would like to join us.

judith at yehudit dot org

I’m not sure yet who will be there exactly, but Judith knows. She's in charge.

Here are some scenes from recent late-night drunken happy socializing in Jerusalem.

Benjamin and Noah.jpg

Benjamin Kerstein (left) and Noah Pollak (right).

Noah is Assistant Editor at Azure magazine. He was crazy enough to go north with me and get shot at by Hezbollah a few weeks ago.

Benjamin is the man behind the famous Diary of an Anti-Chomskyite blog. He also recently wrote a review of Paul Berman’s terrific new book Power and the Idealists for Azure.

Lee Smith in Jerusalem.jpg

Multinational bar-hopping buddy Lee Smith who traveled from Beirut to Jerusalem under fire during the Lebanon war. Lee recently wrote about the death of the great Arab writer Naguib Mahfouz for Slate and Hezbollah’s defeat for The Weekly Standard.

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Me and Louis Stigsgaard Nissen, Middle East Bureau Chief for Denmark’s largest newspaper Berlingske Tidende.

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Me and Lee Smith.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 12:02 PM

More from the Gaza Border

So I went back to the Gaza border and interviewed IDF Major Tal Lev-Ram just as a huge Palestinian tunnel being dug on its way to Israel was located and bombed. We talked with the sound of machine gun fire off in the distance. Good times.

The very short “newsy” version is posted over at Time. I’ll have a much longer and in-depth version posted here when I get a chance to write it.

Posted by Michael J. Totten at 11:55 AM